Global Journal of History of International Relations & Diplomacy (GJOHIRD)
An International Journal Domiciled in the Department of History & Diplomatic Studies, Adeyemi Federal University of Education, Ondo, Ondo State, Nigeria.
Vol.1, No.1, Feb. 2026.

ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION AND THE STATE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA NATURAL RESOURCES, INSECURITY AND THE ENVIRONMENT.

Olawari D. J. Egbe, Ph.D.
Department of Political Science
Niger Delta University
Wilberforce Island Bayelsa State
odjegbe@gmail.com

&

Victor Sokari
Department of Political Science
Niger Delta University
Wilberforce Island Bayelsa State
sokarivictor777@gmail.com
&
Woyengitari Imbazi
Department of Sociology
Niger Delta University
Wilberforce Island Bayelsa State
imbaziwoyengitari@gmail.com

Abstract
Though it is endowed with the highest level of biodiversity in the world, Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is the poorest region in the world, and it stands to be slipping further behind. This paper revealed economic globalisation as the main cause, because it has shrunken the power of the state in Africa. It identified three major domains that have bolstered economic globalisation in keeping Africa from meeting-up with other continents. The first is the avidity for raw materials/natural resources as demonstrated by the global North; the second is the economic interest in Western military interventions in Africa's numerous armed intractable conflicts; and the third is, the enormous environmental degradation/externalities suffered by the continent from the unbridled external interest in Africa's rich biodiversity. This article using the world system theory as its theoretical framework, argues that so long as this economic-driven external interests for the exploitation of Africa's rich biodiversity subsists, Africa stands to be in retreat under economic globalisation.

Keywords: *Economic Globalisation, Environment, Natural Resources, SSA, State*

Introduction

The debate on the retreat (shrink/eclipse) of the nation-state (Brown, 1973; Deutsch, 1981; Strange, 1996; Yergin, & Stanislaw, 2002; Rittberger, & Nettesheim, 2008) vis-à-vis no state-retreat (Gilpin, 2001; Culp, et al, 2003; Flint & Taylor, 2018) writ large while it lasted. However, with the victory of the latter, research into the resurgence of the nation-state has gained momentum since 2010. This was hallmarked by the United States' bail-out of economic giants General, Ford and Chrysler Motors' Corporations, etc. This singular act resurged the U.S. into a position of ascendancy vis-à-vis the power of economic globalisation (defined as the integration of global economies) (OECD, 1997; Gallagher, 2009); whose main foot-solder in Transnational Corporation (TNC) has been at work globally (Jensen, 2006; Leipziger, 2010; Post-Crisis World Institute, 2010). This particular endeavour by the

U.S. strongly bolsters this message: "that governments in all countries have been thrust back onto centre stage as markets have either failed to function or gyrated greatly, making it difficult fo-r businesses to operate" (Leipziger, 2010, p. 11) and has brought to rest the scholarly debate on the retreat of the Westphalian state vis-à-vis the power of TNCs.

The U.S., a First World country, triumphed over the dominance of global capital; however, this is in sharp contrast to the fate of countries of the global South; especially states in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). The main thrust of this paper is stated thus: While in an era of economic globalisation the state in the global North has since been resurgent from retreat; the state in SSA is still neck-deep in retreat—a precarious predicament attributable to various causes including an unfriendly global environment that is characterised by salient asymmetries that impact adversely on the economies of Africa (Ndikumana, 2015). In other words, the chapter asks why the state in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is being dwarfed by economic globalisation? This global unfriendliness manifests in SSA in several domains including the crave for natural resource/raw materials extraction, the economics of insecurity in SSA, and environmental spoliation, etc. These domains, unsurprisingly, has made Africa the most marginalised region within the global economy (Collier, 1995). SSA finds itself in this precarious marginalisation because the prevailing global economic system and the security architecture supporting it are all designed to sustain and continue in enriching the cornucopia of Western lifestyle at the expense of SSA (Chinweizu, 1978; Ojo, 19999; Roll, & Sperling, 2011; Obi, 2012). This reality was conceded to by foremost Western scholar, Samuel P. Huntington, who noted that "the West in effect is using international institutions, military power, and economic resources to run the world in ways that will maintain Western dominance, protect Western interests and promote Western political and economic values" (Huntington, 1993, p. 40). Helplessly, SSA watch the economic and techno-scientific differences between them and the rest of the world, especially the West widen by the day (Engel & Olsen, 2005).

In continuing with this argument, the paper is structured as follows: Section II is on World System Theory (WST) as the chapter's theoretical framework. It argues that there is a subsisting international division of labour which assigns countries to playing assigned roles as either core or periphery states. Section III examines the impacts of economic globalisation on sub-Saharan Africa. It identifies the themes of

(a) the external crave for raw materials extraction in SSA,
(b) the economics of external security interest in Africa's several crises and
(c) environmental spoliation in SSA as the explanations of SSA's marginalisation under economic globalisation. Section IV concludes the chapter noting mainly that economic globalisation is unfair to Africa because the relationship is skewed against it.

World System Theory

This chapter anchors its theoretical discourse on the World System Theory (WST) which owes its place in the Social Sciences to Immanuel Wallerstein; who argues that there is a subsisting global division of labour that is compatible to what countries do in the world. He further argues that in the international division of labour states are assigned specific roles to undertake. In Wallerstein's estimation, the assigned roles of specific states fall into core, semi-peripheral and peripheral states. Under this schema the core states feed on the semi-peripheral states and the peripheral states as sources of natural resources, cheap labour, and market for industrialised goods. Wallerstein (1974, 437) defines a World System as:

> A social system, one that has boundaries, structures, member groups, rules of legitimation, and coherence. Its life is made up of the conflicting forces which hold it together by tension and tear it apart as each group seeks eternally to remould it to its advantage. It has the characteristics of an organism, in that it has a lifespan over which its characteristics change in some respects and remain stable in others...Life within it

> is largely self-contained, and the dynamics of its development are largely internal.

Building on Wallerstein's original work, Chase-Dunn and Grimes (1995) argues that the world system structured by a power hierarchy of the core and periphery; with the 'core' states of the global North dominate and expropriate the raw materials of the poor peripheral states of the global South. The functionality of this schema depends to a large extent on the role of technology in assigning a state to the core or periphery where the industrialised states of the global North are in the core, while states of the global South occupy the periphery (Doorenspleet, 2001). Under this international division of labour of states, the internal workings of peripheral states are structurally hindered to undergo a perverse development that reproduces their subordinate status caused by the activities of TNCs of the global North (Gilpin, 1987; Jeyifo, 2009).

States in sub-Saharan Africa perfectly fit into the World-System schema serving as a source of labour, source of market, supply of natural resources and strictly ensuring SSA as a conflict-free region suitable for resource expropriation. In the context of security in the SSA, Nigeria, Ghana, and a host of other states are noteworthy in Liberia and Sierra Leone (through ECOMOG), etc. In compensation, Nigeria and its fellow ECOMOG member states have been rewarded for their 'kind gestures' with economic aid, military assistance (arms sale, provision of arms, military training, etc.) and even democracy assistance. SSA has been reliable peripheral state by contributing to the international division of labour by making a steady supply of raw materials in renewable and non-renewable minerals to the global North (Kieh, 2016, pp. 37, 56). This unfavourable international division of labour is in consonance with Article 25 of the Charter of Imperialism which says "our duty is to keep Africa and other countries of the world in underdevelopment, misery, division, wars, chaos in order to dominate, exploit and plunder them through the "Missions" of " United Nations ".

Impact of Economic Globalisation on SSA

The theory of the "race to the bottom"—a theory that explains how TNCs of the West are allowed to invest freely in mostly resource-rich African states with loose environmental regulations (Smith, 2014) is not only carried on by TNCs but are accompanied by their respective home states (Gilpin, 1971, 1987; Hymer, 1979). This race adversely impacts on economies of SSA and consequently dwarfs the state in SSA through the following ways:

a. Natural Resource Exploitation in SSA

Under economic globalisation, state consumption of goods and services depends on national and international sources for their natural resources (*Hickel & Kallis, 2019)*. This compels states to place undue pressure on natural resources from within and external sources through international trade (*Taherzadeh, et al, 2021)*. This violates a minimum benchmark of sustainable development that demand for goods and services are met without compromising the resource base wherein they rely (i.e., capacities of biosphere). This happens to be the hallmark of all states in the prevailing international economic order (Erb, et al, 2012; O'Neill, et al, 2018). Whereas, societal development is dependent on its capacity to tap into the resources of the biosphere, these resources over time stand to be exhausted or deteriorated (Holy, 1980), and stands to suffer from resource insecurity (*Taherzadeh, et al, 2021*). Regrettably, sub-Saharan Africa, though, a perpetrator is more of a victim of global rush for and the commercialisation of its natural resources—a trend that even undermines statehood in Africa.

In an era of economic globalisation where illicit natural resource extraction is preponderant, the industrialised countries of the West and their numerous TNCs operating in SSA are implicated in illegal extraction and trade in natural resources. Foremost political economist Samir Amin, for example, implicates the U.S. of a strategy for the global South that "aims only at looting their resources" with the comradeship of Africa's comprador class amenable to Western interest (Bond, 2006, p. viii). This not only undermines statehood in SSA, but also acts tantamount to

committing international environmental crime—the conscious evasion of environmental regulations and laws by persons and TNCs for gaining enormous profits.

Africa has been victim of illicit trade in several natural resources. First, trade in wildlife while it remains a source of meat for human consumption, it is also a major contributor to local economies in SSA and yet there is an illegal trade in Africa's wildlife that is perpetrated by external actors with locals as their collaborators (Brashares, et al, 2004; Dearden, 2017; EIA, 2021). Second, trade in illicitly acquired African artifacts is an ever-growing business in the continent that receives enormous patronage dealers filling orders from the U.S., South Africa and Europe (Steiner, 1994; Labi & Robinson, 2001; Hicks, 2021); a troubling trend made popular by poverty and war has compelled the International Council of Museums (2016) to publish a red list of African archaeological objects at greatest risk of looting.

Third, there is an intense illegal extraction of the fisheries sector in SSA by foreign fishing companies (Brack, 2007; *Shiva, 2016)*. Illegal fishing in SSA incorporates such related crimes as "fishing without a license, fishing in protected areas, the use of banned fishing gear, catching beyond limits, and catching protected species" (Standing, 2017, p. 4). This act deprives African states and its citizens of a valuable source of revenue and impacts SSA as the only region where fish stocks and consumption are drastically fast declining. Under such precarious overexploitation Shannon Beebe (in Marqusee, 2010, para: 4) wondered loudly:

> what happens when a man is already a fisherman and you take all his fish away? You create a pirate. *The environmental and human security threat of overfishing in Somalia was not taken seriously as a security threat until it was left unchecked for 20 years and developed into a real kinetic threat of piracy.* Until we stop giving Africans and the developing world our definition of what is right for their security and start listening to what they are saying is relevant to their security, we are going to continue to marginalise ourselves.

Fourth, in SSA, there has been an alarming forceful takeover of natural lands and even game reserves (i.e., land grabs) by foreign companies for industrialised/mechanised farming, dam construction, irrigation purposes, forest conversion into monocultures for industrial raw materials, etc. (Bhargava, et al, 2019). *Western scholarship argues that these activities generate revenue and growth; however, in refutation foremost environmentalist Vandana Shiva say* "this growth is based on robbing the forest of its biodiversity and its capacity to conserve soil and water. This growth is based on robbing forest communities of their sources of food, fodder, fuel, fiber, medicine, and security from floods and drought" (*Shiva, 2016*, p. 8).

Land grabs affect whole communities by displacement without adequate compensations or resettlement schemes. While, deforestation and land degradations are, among other effects, resulting from external interests in Africa's forests and land (Silver & DeFries, 1990; Lawson & MacPaul, 2010; Hoare, 2015; Kleinschmit, et al, 2016); this interest is patronised and supported by a forest and finance programme, a scheme that is into bank financing of forest-risk companies that engages in deforestation-risk products in Africa (Warmerdam, 2021). The banks culpable in the context here include, Barclays, HSBC, Santander, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, Morgan Stanley, Deutsche Bank, and Standard Chartered, etc., that are implicated in financing rogue agrobusinesses such as Cargill and Koch Brothers (Mighty Earth, 2019), that are complicit in deforesting rainforests; especially through illegal logging (Global Witness) or by converting huge land mass into mechanised monocultures that produces palm oil, cheap meat, and chocolate (Mighty Earth, 2019).

With this worrisome trend already prevalent in parts of SSA such as Cameroon, Ethiopia (the Gambella region through the "villagilation" programme), Sudan, South Sudan, and Zambia, etc., are unfortunately harbingers to hunger,

starvation, famine and misery in SSA (HRW, 2012a&b; Allan, et al, 2013). This is because "food is our most basic need, the very stuff of life…All that is born is born of *anna* (food). Whatever exists on earth is born of *anna*, lives on *anna*, and in the end merges into *anna. Anna* indeed is the first born amongst all beings" (*Shiva*, 2016, p. 11).

Tired of their pitiful states, forest peoples in SSA cried out to foreign timber companies operating in their lands thus: "Timber company you are selling our homes" (*Merchant, 2005*). More to the point, in violation of the U.S.' Lacey Act (a legislation amended in 2008 that prohibits the illegal importation of any wood *product from a foreign country*) foreign companies have been engaged in illegal logging of timber and forest conversion in different parts of Africa, especially Cameroon (*Horta, 1991)*. The government at Yaoundé, Cameroon, authorised the Cameroon Vert SARL (Camvert) to clear 60,000 hectares of the Bagyeli indigenous peoples' land, area rich in biodiversity and palm plantation. Furthermore, the forest people of Baka land are forcefully evicted by Sud-Cameroun Hévéa ("Sudcam"), a subsidiary of Halcyon Agri Corporation Limited, for a proposed rubber plantation (Greenpeace, 2019). And lieu of losing their lands, these indigenous peoples are compensated with such gifts as canned tomatoes, bags of rice, and soap (Harris, 2020).

In the U.S., Gibson Guitar Factories, located in Nashville and Memphis has been complicit in patronising illegal logging of timber, especially ebony (from Madagascar) and rosewood (India); varieties that are highly demanded for guitar making. These varieties of timber are particularly needed for their durability and tonal quality in making guitar; however, the tree species of these tropical woods are logged from are endangered because of overexploitation and illicit deforestation (*Balaam & Dillman, 2014)*. These activities violate several charters /declarations/ communiques of deforestation including the Tirana Declaration (*ILC, 2011)*, the 2022 Afrik-Akili Declaration and New York Declaration on Forests (*NYDF, n.d.*).

Fifth, is trade in natural resources, especially oil and gas, uranium, copper, cobalt, and platinum. Trade in these raw materials oscillates between licit and illicit trade (Brack, et al, 2007) because of the pristine value they add to both exporter (resource-rich states in SSA) and importer nations (such as TNCs and their home governments). In fact, the resurgent interest in Africa's natural resources—what is now referred to as the new scramble for Africa by Western and other emerging powers like China, India, Russia, etc.—is traceable to Africa's richness in raw materials that are avidly needed by these powers (Harris, 2017). This revived interest in Africa, of course, is not devoid of remote and immediate implications. First, Africa is under unusual securitisation from Western and other emerging powers desirous to protect their economic interests (Ismail & Skons, 2014; Volman, 2015). Second, resource extractions impact adversely on the environment of such resource-rich states as Nigeria (the Niger Delta), Angola (the Cabinda region), Tanzania (the Island of Songo-Songo), Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Sudan, South Sudan, etc.; a trend which often attract crisis situations (*Roll & Sperling, 2011;* Dannreuther & Ostrowski, 2013. Third, natural resource extraction, while it benefits the host states in rents and royalties, the profit expropriated by the TNCs to their home states far out ways the accruable benefits to their respective host states in trends that, over the course of time dwarfs the capacity of the host states to regulate their economic activities (*Ezeonu, 2018)*. An overview of sectoral financial outflows from SSA indicates that TNCs repatriate $32.4 billion annually; $17.0 billion is annually repatriated as lost revenue from illegal logging; $1.7 billion is lost in revenue to illegal fishing; $10.0 billion in revenue is lost to illegal trade in wildlife, plants and poaching; $67.6 billion is lost from illicit financial outflows; brain drains cost SSA $6.0 billion; a whopping $18.0 billion and $9.8 billion are respectively paid as debt payments by SSA governments and by the private sector, etc. (Global Justice Now, 2017, p. 9).

Watchers of the prevailing international economic relations in Africa vis-à-vis other regions of the world have expressed mixed

feelings to the afore-discussed developments. In the context of the paradox of Africa's abject poverty amidst its richness in raw materials, Global Justice Now (2017) implicates Western countries as responsible for the plight of SSA arguing that "Western countries are extracting far more than they send back. Meanwhile, they are pushing economic models that fuel poverty and inequality, often in alliance with African elites" (Global Justice Now, 2017). It was the considered opinion of Peebles (2022) that SSA ought not to be in the precarious poverty they find themselves because, in the first place, they are endowed with enormous natural resources. He insists that poverty in SSA is political, resulting from political cum economic decisions of "the economic structures, global institutions and economic ideologies championed by abusive self-centred governments and promoted in the business schools around the world are all designed to ensure Africa remains poor…imperialism never ended, it just changed form" (Peebles, 2022).

Arieff (2015) in his review of Professor Burgis' work, "*The Looting Machine: Warlords, Oligarchs, Corporations, Smugglers, and the Theft of Africa's Wealth"* unreservedly stated that:

> I started to see the thread that connects a massacre in a remote African village with the pleasures and comforts that we in the richer parts of the world enjoy. It weaves through the globalised economy, from war zones to the pinnacles of power and wealth in New York, Hong Kong, and London…Outsiders often think of Africa as a great drain of philanthropy, a continent that guzzles aid to no avail and contributes little to the global economy in return. But look more closely at the resource industry, and the relationship between Africa and the rest of the world looks rather different…In 2010, fuel and mineral exports from Africa were worth $333 billion, more than seven times the value of the aid that went in the opposite direction (and that is before you factor in the vast sums spirited out of the continent through corruption and tax fiddles).

Foremost scholar, Professor Howard Nicholas of the International Institute of Social Studies, Erasmus University, Rotterdam, delivering a paper he titled, "We Must Keep Africa Poor by All Means", submits thus:

> Africa historically, sub-Saharan Africa has been fundamental to the global prosperity, for us the advanced counties…and Africa has a role to play. It has a role as a raw material producer. We will not allow SSA to escape that. We do everything to keep SSA where it is; also impoverished. It is absolutely vital to the prosperity of everyone else. So, let us be clear about that. And this means all the economic structures, all the global institutions and the economics we teach everyone is all designed to keep Africa exactly where it is. And whether it is Europe or U.S. or now China, it is always the same. We need Africa to be impoverished because we need those raw materials and we need them to achieve. That is the message. (Nicholas, n.d.)

And he continued:

> It does not mean to say there is nothing Africa can do. Of course, there is. But this is the position they find things because if Africa does do something different, I assure you, living standards for all those in Europe and America and Asia is going to fall and that we cannot afford and that is a price to pay. I assure you that the West will not allow that without a big fight. This is what fundamentally about…why I keep the ideology part is because we are part of the producers of ideology at universities and academic institutions, we are complicit in this whole enterprise. The job of all Western academics is to convince Africans to keep doing what they are doing and to show them it is your fault that you are poor. It is not our fault. It is your fault that you are poor

> and this is what we do in academic institutions. (Nicholas, n.d.)

The foregoing presentation explains how and why the West ensures Africa stays poor for the survival of the West and to sustain their way of life.

a. Economics in Externally-Driven Security Intervention in SSA

No doubt, Africa is notoriously entangled in several intractable armed conflicts that are attributed to many conflict attractors; especially natural resources (Cohen, 2000; Brock, 2011; Schmidt, 2013). Africa's several armed conflicts have since attracted external interests and even military interventions from Western powers (Taylor & Williams, 2004; Engel & Olsen, 2005; Nhema & Zeleza, *2008;* Skons, 2014; Sidorova & Lyubenova, 2020). Interestingly, non-state security actors and unregulated private military and security companies (Musah & Fayemi, 2000; Mandel, 2002; Avant, 2005) have shown interest. Worrisomely, Western NGOs are also complicit. They, in search of the rare Uranium 238 (not Californium-252 Stone as allegedly stated [Mandy, 2022]), go to Maiduguri, Borno State to render supportive services to the poor that are heavily affected by Boko Haram insurgency, as against the uncomfortable weather conditions and the widespread insecurity in the area (ITREALMS, 2022).

Africa, however, faces this dilemma: while it sees security as an attempt to ensure peace and provide a good quality of life for its population, the notion of security provision by external actors is purely "viewed through the prism of whiteness, profit maximisation and preservation of global economic hegemony through perpetual warfare, dominance of U.S. finance entities" (Campbell, 2017, p. 46). It is purely an economic endeavour or simply looting that premised on what they can gain from the continent and not what they can give to it (Cilliers & Fraser, 1999). This is what is variously referred to as the "booming of the crime economy", "economics by other means" or the marketisation/commercialisation of war in Africa (Keen, 2005; Ingiriis, 2021); this being an economic imperialism long exposed by Africa's Marxist scholars like Frantz Fanon, Amilcar Cabral and particularly Walter Rodney's 1972 work, "*How Europe Underdeveloped Africa"* and Paul Zeleza's "*A Modern Economic History of Africa*".

Unarguably, there is a conflict of interest in Africa's security provision architecture. It essentially insists that external security provision such as counterterrorism measures in the SSA is not free (Keenan, 2013). Baldly stated, there is a price that Africa pays for such external interests; primarily, it is to safeguard the vital economic interests of external powers (i.e., SSA's raw materials that are vital to Western economic and military needs (Servant & Forster, 2003; Ismail & Skons, 2014), the for-profit motive in the sale of arms to SSA's governments enmeshed in crises and to rebels/warlords (Brauer & Dunne, 2002; Mumford, 2013; Hoffman & Orner, 2021) and worse still the extension of expected duration of most conflicts in SSA (Regan, 2002). The value of Africa's resources to Western needs are alluded to by the worries expressed by two Western powers with the dominant proclivity to intervene in African crises—the U.S. and France (Ojo, 1999). In continuing with this line of the discourse, the following sections examine economics-induced security provisions of the U.S. and France in SSA.

The United States

The Persian Gulf served U.S. energy needs for several years; a trend that influenced the U.S. not to look elsewhere for its energy needs (Shelley, 2005). However, the volatility of the Middle East, especially after the 9/11 terror attack on U.S. home soil, compelled it to explore alternative sources of energy supplies. The Gulf of Guinea (GoG) became the immediate succour to U.S.' secured energy needs (Volman, 2003; Leech, 2006) and ever since the U.S. has never hidden its interest in SSA (APAP, 2004). The choice of the GoG was in tandem with the Dick Cheney Report and a request by the African Oil Initiative Group that recommended that "the Gulf of Guinea be declared an area of vital interest to the U.S.; that a regional subcommand be established in the area; and that adversaries' including 'rogue' Arab states and U.S. rivals such as China be deterred from the area" (Shelley, 2005, p. 105).

In consonance with the foregoing accords, the U.S. has since militarised its efforts at securing energy supplies from the GoG (Klare & Volman, 2006; de Oliveira & Cardoso, 2020; Williams, 2021); an agenda covertly done by the CIA (Williams, 2021). In Nigeria's Niger Delta known for its volatility and several insurgent movements, the U.S. among others, has provided huge sums of dollars to procure arms for Nigeria's military formations operating in the Niger Delta (Klare, 2004; Copson, 2007); it has organised several military programmes including the International Military Education and Training Programme (IMET), the African Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA) programme (Volman, 2003); it provided naval warships to the Nigerian Navy to secure its oil interest in the GoG (Oruh, 2008, p. 21); and lastly, the Nigerian government has been a major importer of military arms from the U.S. for securing U.S. oil interests in the GoG (Wezeman, et al, 2011, p. 7).

In Central Africa's intractable conflicts, intervening external states never hid their interest in the sharing of "revenues from the extraction of mineral and other resources" (Taylor, 2003, p. 47). In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Madsen (in Taylor, 2003, p. 48) reported that:

> America Mineral Fields directly benefited from America's initial covert military and intelligence support for Kabila. It is my observation that America's early support for Kabila, which was aided and abetted by U.S. allies Rwanda and Uganda, had less to do with getting rid of the Mobutu regime than it had to do with opening up Congo's vast mineral riches to North American-based and influenced mining companies.

France

It was in the least intention of France to leave Africa when it granted political independence to its erstwhile colonies; because despite decolonisation, France continued to showcase its presence in Africa for some purely economic motives (Chafer, 2001). It has remained active in economic and military matters in its former colonies (Alli, 2012); including the economic-induced military interventions Africa's armed conflicts. France undertakes military interventions in Africa's troubled spots under the following projects it considers salient to its security: first, is the project on the suppression of crisis that impair the supply of raw materials.

France considers whatever threat to its supply of raw materials as a direct attack on its frontiers because it secures from Africa 100% Cobalt, 100% uranium, 72% manganese, 55% chrome, 33% iron, and 25% lead (Ojo, 1999); second, is the neocolonial project which by all means possible provides military security to its former colonial governments; including arms supplies (Daly, 2014). This sort of security alliance is still motivated by economic intentions such as secured supply of raw materials (Nwankwo, 1988); and, third, is the globalist project—a medium France propagates its status and capitalism in a bid to reposition its grandeur as France. It is the vision of this project that Africa's as its huge followership makes it a dominant power in international politics. France believes that Africa is the space where it could find political following, economic elbow room for expansion and dissuades itself from superpower hegemony (Luckham, 1982). Unfortunately, these trends dating back to the early 20th century continues till this day (Harris, 1911; Labouret, 1940; Aglion, 1944; Harshe, 1980).

Worried by the militarisation of natural resources by state actors, watchers of armed conflicts in Africa have expressed mixed feelings towards economic-motivated Western military interventions in Africa. Kofi Annan (1998) sounded that "despite the devastation that armed conflicts bring, there are many who profit from chaos and lack of accountability and who may have little or no interest in stopping a conflict and have much interest in prolonging it". Second, curious over the undue prolongation of conflicts in Africa, Hollywood actor, George Clooney, in conjunction with John Prendergast, a U.S. human rights activist, launched this project called the "Sentry that aims to investigate the flow of money in and out of conflict zones and give policymakers the tools to take effective action" (The Guardian, 2015).

Third, Clare Daly, member of the European Parliament representing Dublin Constituency, Ireland, while making her presentation on the debate on the "EU's strategic relationship and partnership with the Horn of Africa" expressed worry over the arms built-up by Western powers in the Horn of Africa. She stated:

> Madam President, I do not think you have to be a genius to know the last thing the Horn of Africa needs is more foreign military bases, more weapons and more European meddling. What we call our "strategic relationship" is not about human flourishing. It is about the EU's ambitions as a superpower. There is now a new great game in the Horn of Africa. Greater and lesser powers are pockmarking the place with military bases—France, the U.S., China, Germany, Japan, Italy, Saudi Arabia—all have a presence in the tiny area of Djibouti alone. Mercenaries are swarming in from all quarters; the entire region is being militarized. War is in the air. And what about the people facing climate and food insecurity? None of this benefits them. We talk about instability, but we only make it worse. We flood the place with weapons and handover the profits to European arms companies and charge the bill to our citizens. And then with the carnage, we go back in and we do it all again. It is a racket. Strategic relationship? It is one thing after another, isn't it? Really it is the same as it ever was. And all I can say is, God save Africa from Europeans offering help. (Daly, 2022)

It is, indeed, true that armed conflicts in Africa have turned to a racket for foreign security providers.

a. Environmental Spoliation in SSA

The foregoing two domains (i.e., external interest in raw materials and economics in external military intervention in SSA) have one thing as their common denominator—both domains cause environmental degradation (Austin & Bruch, 2010; Das, 2013). This happens because globalisation's major foot-soldier, the TNC, has been let loose to seek, explore, and exploit natural resources; especially point resources (fossil fuels) anywhere in the globe. Most often SSA, the richest continent in biodiversity, is its first destination of exploration of key raw materials needed in the global North. However, SSA is consequently losing this abundance at an alarming rate (Ojo, 1999). For example, fossil fuels exploitation (as shown in Table 1 below) in its entirety adversely impacts on the environment (Omoweh, 2005).

Table 1 Crude Oil Exploration and their Impacts on the Environment

S/N	Activity/Event No.	Actual and Potential Impact on the Environment
1	Exploration–including geological surveys and geophysical investigations.	Destruction of forest land, vegetation and farm land/human settlement. Noise pollution and vibration from seismic shooting. Effects on animals and nearby settlers (on shore) and on fish eries (near/offshore) Disturbances of flora and fauna habitats. Dislocation of economic activity. Tension on the social environment due to compensation disagreements.
2	Drilling	Accumulation of toxic materials from drilling materials, oil pollution of the sea, beaches or land. Destruction of fisheries production. Destruction of breeding ground for some marine fisheries. Alteration of the taste of fish. Killing of bottom dwellers. Pollution of underground water (waste pots). Adverse health effect on huma ns, social tension arising from compensation disagreements from accidental spills from locations.

3	Production/Process: (i) Plat forms and tank farms	Water pollution from long term cumulative effects of produced water (with high salin ity). Water pollution from salinity waste, used lubricating oil and solid waste. Main effects on marine life
	(ii) Gas flaring	Air pollution from gas and processing evaporation and flaring. Production of heat kills vegetation around the heat area. Suppresses the growth an d flowering of some plants. Reduces agricultural productivity and wild life concentration in area.
4	Refining Petroleum	Air pollution and waste water impacting negatively on human health and ecosystem.
5	Oil spillage	Destruction of farmland, fishery a nd aquatic resources and mangrove ecosystem. Water pollution. Creates social tension due to compensation disagreements.
6	Tanker loading, location (on shore and off shore)	Water pollution from ballast and tank washing. Deck drainage, spillage during loa ding operation with accompanying effects on the fauna and flora. Disruption of seabed by dredging (i.e., canalisation).
7	Storage Depot	Land pollution from effluent water and solid waste of chemical cans and drums. Destruction of farmland for the establi shment of storage depots, water pollution from effluent water. Air pollution from gaseous fumes during loading.
8	Transportation	Disruption of the sea -bed by dredging for pipeline installation. Sedimentation along pipeline routes. Water pollution from c onsequences of leaks from fracturing or breaking of pipe caused by metal fatigue, trawlers and dredges or sea floor failures, and sabotage. Air pollution by transport tankers. Destruction of environmentally sensitive area e.g., lowland, where estuaries, we t lands and sand dune fields exist. Erosion and flooding of the area drastically affected.
9	Marketing	Pollution of immediate environments from retail outlets. High hazard potentials were located near residential buildings.

Source: Orubu et al, 2004, p. 205.

Undermining the illustrated dangers in Table 2 to the environment in SSA, there is still an upsurge in natural resource exploration with no end in sight. This particular resource exploitation is even encouraged by global institutions as the World Bank which is known to demonstrate an enormous environmental blindness in SSA (Thomas, 1992; Timamy, 2007). In its environment blindness, the World Bank was Janus-faced when it said:

> the human family, in its quest for change, engages in activities that can go on forever. The environment, however, is finite. This disparity creates an environmental challenge; the critical need to reconcile a potential conflict between human effort and environmental constraints. (Conable, 1989, pp. 235-36)

Going by the World Bank's position above:

> ...it is apparent that the emperor's new clothes bear only faint traces of green. Instead of becoming a leading environmental lender, the Bank has become an arena where the political, practical, and theoretical difficulties of reconciling economic development with ecological sustainability are most glaring. (Rich, 1990, p. 306)

Such acquisitive tendencies by the World Bank are illustrations of the avidity for natural resource by the global North that undermines the environment in SSA (Esty & Ivanova, 2003). Worried by the environmental callousness of the global North and their numerous TNCs in SSA, delegates to a September 2005 conference organised by the South African NGO groundWork in Johannesburg petitioned the World Petroleum Congress:

> At every point in the fossil fuel production chain where your members add value and make profit, ordinary people, workers and their environments are assaulted and impoverished. Where oil is drilled, pumped, processed and used in Africa as elsewhere, ecological systems have been trashed, peoples' livelihoods have been destroyed…your energy future is modelled on the interests of overconsuming, energy intensive, fossil-fuel-burning, wealthy classes whose reckless and selfish lifestyles not only impoverish others but threaten the global environment, imposing on all of us the chaos and uncertainty of climate change and the violence and destruction of war. Another energy future is necessary: yours has failed. (Bond, 2006, p. 76)

Aside activities of oil TNCs, environmental spoliation in SSA also happens through trade in toxic waste, what Marbury (1995) refers to as garbage imperialism. Indeed, it is an illicit trade that thrives large in SSA (Park, 1998; Ajibo, 2016). In violation of the 1989 Basel Convention and the Basel Ban Amendment prohibiting toxic waste trade, trade in toxic waste from the developed North to the developing South; especially in SSA is unprecedentedly high and alarmingly impactful on the environment and health of citizens. Africa became a hot spot for dumping of toxic waste when regulations became stiff and the cost of disposal in the developed North became expensive. Governments in SSA in themselves are gullible to this harmful trade by waste trading companies in their desperation for foreign exchange (Clapp, 1994).

These unfriendly attitudes towards the environment persists in total violation of the various earth summits such as the 1992 Rio Summit; 2002 Summit on Sustainable Development; and Agenda 21 and even in breach of the 1987 Brundtland Report reached on protecting the environment. Agitated by such negligence, Thabo Mbeki on the occasion of the opening ceremony of the World Summit for Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, 26 August 2002, unequivocally observes:

> We have all converged at the Cradle of Humanity to confront the social behaviour that has pity neither for beautiful nature nor for living human beings. This social behaviour has produced and entrenches a global system of apartheid…poverty, underdevelopment, inequality within and among countries, together with the worsening global ecological crisis, sum up the dark shadow under which most of the world lives...A global human society based on poverty for many and prosperity for a few, characterised by islands of wealth, surrounded by a sea of poverty, is unsustainable. (Mbeki, 2002)

Reversing such fears depends on a drastic change in global consumption patterns which usually result in wealth-induced environmental damage occurring from industrialised production and the lifestyles of developed economies and poverty-related environmental damage when poverty causes destruction of the environment through oil pipeline damage, oil bunkering activities, over-felling of trees of the rainforest, etc. (Zurn, 1996).

This section highlighted three basic domains (i.e., external interest in raw materials, economics in external security interest in Africa and environmental spoliation committed by external actors) that illustrated that the African state under economic globalisation is still in retreat. However, this trend needs to be put in the reverse gear because of the ominous signs already evolving. For example, U Thant, former Secretary-General of the United Nations, cautions that the Third World War will be the war to save the environment (Moore, 2010, p. 7). For Lewis (2015, p. 48) "man's power over nature turns out to be a power exercised by some men over other men with nature as its instrument", implying that the global North has weaponised its high technological knowhow in converting nature as an instrument of oppression to the global South.

Conclusion

It is vital not to glorify the state of things in SSA; especially its numerous conflicts. This chapter began with the submission that the state in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is in retreat or being dwarfed by economic globalisation; implying that it weakens the state in Africa, makes political authorities in Africa to be helpless before the forces of international businesses (TNCs) that do business in their territories, and even makes governance difficult. These implications affirm the fact that, while it is incontestable that economic globalisation has both positive and negative impacts on SSA, what is more glaring is that the negative impacts outweigh the positive effects. To this end, the chapter identified the domains of external interest in Africa's natural resource extraction, economic-induced external intervention in SSA's several armed conflicts and environmental spoliation resulting from the earlier two domains as being responsible for Africa being in retreat—a tendency caused by the economic-driven activities of Western powers, their numerous TNCs and non-state actors operating in the continent.

State retreat in Africa (i.e., the shrunken power of the African state) has several unintended negative consequences on the society. At the national level, it induces human exploitation that often takes place in the shadows, it throws people into poverty, it alienates farmers from their ancestral lands, it imposes unwarranted displacements, it often fuels conflicts and violence, hinders development, and threatens the environment. Globally, economic globalisation affects Africa in that it has the power to make the world both more unequal and unfair against Africa. Moreso, it shows that economic globalisation is after all not a force for the global good; especially that it is already instigating sceptics of economic globalisation to doubt the moral and ethical standards of economic globalisation.

References

Africa Policy Advisory Panel (APAP, 2004). Rising U.S. Stakes in Africa: Seven Proposals to Strengthen U.S.-Africa Policy. The CSIS Press.

Aglion, R. (1944). French colonial Policy. *World Affairs*, 107(2), 78-81.

Ajibo, K. I. (2016). Transboundary Wazardous wastes and Environmental Justice: Implications for Economically Developing Countries. *Environmental Law Review*, 18(4), 267-283.

Allan, T., Keulertz, M., Sojamo, S., & Warner, J. (2013). *Handbook of Land and Water Grabs in Africa: Foreign Direct Investment and Food and Water Security*. Routledge.

Alli, W. O. (2012), The Role of Nigeria in Regional Security Policy. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Regional Office.

Annan, K. (1998). Report of the Secretary-General: The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa. Security Council Report S/1998/318, UNO, April 13.

Arieff, I. (2015). If Africa is so Rich, why is it so Poor? Accessed 16 October 2022, https://www.passblue.com/2015/05/18/if-africa-is-so-rich-why-is-it-so-poor/.

Austin, J. & Bruch, C. (Ed.) (2010). *The Environmental Consequences of War: Legal, Economic, and Scientific Perspectives*. CUP. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511522321.

Avant, D. D. (2005). *The Market Force: The Consequences of Privatising* Security. Cambridge University Press.

Balaam, D. N. & Dillman, B. (2014). *Introduction to International Political Economy*. 6th ed. Pearson Education Inc.

Bhargava, R. N., Rajaram, V., Olson, K., & Tiede, L. (2019). *Ecology and Environment*. Routledge.

Bond, P. (2006). *Looting Africa: The Economics of Exploitation*. Zed Books Ltd.

Brack, D. (2007). Illegal Trade in Natural Resources. In A. Najam, M. Halle and R. Melendez-Ortiz (eds.), *Trade and Environment: A Resource Book* (pp. 115-122). International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD).

Brashares, J. S., Arcese, P., Sam, M. K., Coppolillo, P. B., Sinclair, A. R. E., & Balmford, A. (2004). Bushmeat Hunting, Wildlife Declines, and Fish Supply in West Africa. *Science*, 306, 1180-1183.

Brauer, J., & Dunne, J. P. (2002). *Arming the South: The Economics of Military Expenditure,Arms Production and Arms Trade in Developing Countries.* Palgrave Publishers Ltd.

Brock, H. (2011). Competition over Resources: Drivers of Insecurity and the Global South. Oxford: Oxford Research Group.

Brown, L. R. (1973). *World Without Borders*. Vintage.

Campbell, H. G. (2017). The United States and Security in Africa: The Impact of the Military Management of the International System. *Africa Development*, 42(3), 45-71.

Chafer, T. (2001). French African Policy in Historical Perspective. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 19(2), 165–82.

Chase-Dunn, C., & Grimes, P. (1995). World-Systems Analysis. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 21, 387-417.

Chinweizu, I. (1978). *The West and the Rest of Us*: *White Predators, Black Slavers and the African Elite*. NOK Publishers.

Cilliers, J., & Fraser, D. (Ed.) (1999). *Peace, Profit or Plunder? The Privatisation of Security in War-torn African Societies*. Institute for Security Studies (ISS).

Clapp, J. (1994). Africa, NGOs, and the International Toxic Waste Trade. *The Journal of Environment & Development*, 3(2), 17-46.

Cohen, H. J. (2000). *Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent*. Macmillan Press Ltd.

Collier, P. (1995). The Marginalisation of Africa. *International Labour Review*, 134(4-5), 541-557.

Conable, B. B. (1989). Development and the Environment: A Global Balance. *American University International Law Review*, 5(2), 235-248.

Copson, R. (2007). *The United States in Africa: Bush Policy and Beyond*. Zed Books.

Culp, C. L., Niskanen, William A. (Ed.) (2003). *Corporate Aftershock; The Public Policy Lessons from Collapse of Enron and other Major Corporations*. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Daly, C. (2022, October 5). The EU's Strategic Relationship and Partnership with the Horn of Africa. Accessed 9 October 2022, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-9-2022-10-04-INT-2-456-0000_EN.html.

Daly, J. C. K. (2014, March 6). Counterterrorism or Neo-colonialism? The French Army in Africa. *Terrorism Monitor*, 12(5), 6-10.

Dannreuther, R., & Ostrowski, W. (Ed.) (2013). *Global Resources: Conflict and Cooperation*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Das, O. (2013). *Environmental Protection, Security and Armed Conflict: A Sustainable Development Perspective*. Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc.

De Oliveira, G. Z. & Cardoso, N. C. F. (2020). Securitisation in Africa in the 21st Century: Analysis of the Situations in the Gulf of Guinea and the Horn of Africa. *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 27(4), 533–560.

Dearden, N. (2017, May 24). Africa is not Poor; We are Stealing its Wealth: It is Time to Change the Way We Talk and Think about Africa. Accessed 1 October 2022,

Deutsch, K. W. The Crisis of the State. *Government and Opposition,* 1981, 16: 331–43.

Doorenspleet, R. (2001). Centre-periphery Relations and Democratisation. Paper prepared for the ECPR Joint Sessions, Workshop for Centre and Periphery, Grenoble, France.

Engel, U. & Olsen, G. R. (Ed.) (2005). *Africa and the North: Between Globalization and Marginalisation*. Routledge.

Engel, U., & Olsen, G. R. (Ed.) (2005). *Africa and the North: Between Globalisation and Marginalization*. Routledge.

Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA) (2021). Double Impact: The Nexus where Wildlife and Forest Crime Overlap. EIA.

Erb, K.-H., Haberl, H., DeFries, R., Ellis, E. C., Krausmann, F., & Verburg, P. H. (2012). Pushing the Planetary Boundaries. *Science*, 338 (6113), 1419–1420.

Esty, D. C., & Ivanova, M. H. (2003). Global and Environmental Protection: A Global Governance Perspective. Paper prepared for Global Environmental Governance: The Post-Johannesburg Agenda, 23-25 October.

Ezeonu, I. (2018). *Market Criminology: State-corporate Crime in the Petroleum Extraction Industry*. Routledge.

Flint, C., Taylor, P. J. (2018). *Political Geography: World Economy, Nation-State and Locality.* 7th ed. Routledge.

Gallagher, K. P. Economic Globalisation and the Environment. *Annual Review of Environment and Resources* 2009, 34: 279-304.

Gilpin, R. (1971). The Politics of Transnational Economic Relations. I*nternational Organisation*, 25(3), 398-419.

Gilpin, R. (1987). *The political economy of international relations*. Princeton University Press.

Gilpin, R. (2001). *Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order*. Princeton University Press.

Global Justice Now (2017). Honest accounts 2017: How the World Profits from Africa's Wealth. Accessed 5 October 2022, https://www.google.com/search?q=Honest%20accounts%202017.

Global Witness (2019, September 23). Money to Burn: How Iconic Banks and Investors Fund the Destruction of the World's Largest Rain Forests. Accessed 6 October 2022, https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/forests/money-to-burn-how-iconic-banks-and-investors-fund-the-destruction-of-the-worlds-largest-rainforests.

Greenpeace (2019). *Sudcam's Assault on Human Rights.* Johannesburg: Greenpeace Africa.

Harris, G. T. (2017). *Why Africa matters to U.S. National Security*. The Atlantic Council.

Harris, N. D. (1911). French Colonial Expansion in West Africa, the Sudan, and the Sahara. *The American Political Science Review*, 5(3), 353-373.

Harris, T. (2020). Greenpeace Africa and Rainforest Rescue: Joint Statement following the Suspension of Logging Plans for Ebo forest, August 13.

Harshe, B. (1980). French Neo-colonialism in Sub-Saharan Africa. *India Quarterly*, 36(2), 159-178.

Hickel, J., & Kallis, G. (2019). Is Green Growth Possible? *New Political Economy*, 1–18.

Hicks, D. (2021). *The brutish museums: The Benin Bronzes, Colonial Violence and Cultural Restitution*. Pluto Press.

Hoare, A. (2015). Tackling Illegal Logging and the Related Trade: What Progress and where Next. Chatham House, RIIA.

Hoffman, F., & Orner, A. (2021, September 2). The Return of Great-Power Proxy Wars. Accessed 12 October 2022, https://warontherocks.com/2021/09/the-return-of-great-power-proxy-wars/.

Holy, M. (1980). *Erosion and* Environment. Pergamon Press Ltd.

Horta, K. (1991). The Last Big Rush for Green Gold: The Plundering of Cameroon's Rainforests. *Ecologist*, 21, 142-47.

Human Rights Watch. (2012a). *Waiting Hhere for Death: Forced Displacement and 'Villagization' in Ethiopia's Gambella* Region. Human Rights Watch.

Human Rights Watch. (2012b). *What will Happen if Hunger Comes: Abuses against the Indigenous Peoples of Ethiopia's Lower Omo Valley*. Human Rights Watch.

Huntington, S. P. (1993). The Clash of Civilisation? *Foreign Affairs*, 72(3), 22-49.

Hymer, S. H. (1979). *The Multinational Corporation: A Radical Approach*. Cambridge University Press.

Ingiriis, M. H. (2021). Profiting from the Conflict in Mogadishu: Capital Accumulation in the Failed State of Somalia. In E. O. Oritsejafor, A. D. Cooper (eds.), *Africa and the Global System of Capital Accumulation* (pp. 132-156). Routledge.

International Council of Museums (2016). A Red List of African Archaeological Objects at Greatest Risk of Looting. Accessed 10 December 2022, https://icom.museum/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/545_En.pdf.

International Land Coalition (2011). Tirana Declaration: Securing Land Access for the Poor in times of Intensified Natural Resources Competition. ILC.

Ismail, O., & Skons, E. (Ed.) (2014). *Security Activities of External Actors in Africa*. Oxford University Press.

ITREALMS (2022, December 22). Exposed! Al-Mustapha Accuses NGOs, Western Countries of Exploiting Nigeria's Californium. Accessed December 15 2022, https://www.itrealms.com.ng/2022/12/al-mustapha-accuses-ngos-western.html.

Jensen, N. M. (2006). *Nation-states and the Multinational Corporation: A Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment.* Princeton University Press.

Jeyifo, B. (2009). The Niger Delta: Our Country, Our Continent and the Global Justice Movement. *The Constitution: Journal of Constitutional Development*, 9(3), 12-26.

Keen, D. (2005). *The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars*. Routledge.

Keenan, J. (2013). *The Dying Sahara: U.S. Imperialism andt Terror in Africa*. Pluto Press.

Kieh, G. K. (2016). Africa and Economic Globalisation. In E. L. Wonkeryor (ed.), *Globalisation and its Implications for Africa*. Africana Homestead Legacy Publishers.

Klare, M. & Volman, D. (2006). The African "Oil

Rush" and U.S. National Security. *Third World Quarterly*, 27(4), 609–28.

Klare, M. (2004). *Blood and Oil: How America's Thirst for Petrol is Killing Us*. Penguin Books.

Kleinschmit, D., Mansourian, S., Wildburger, C., & Purret, A. (Eds.) (2016). *Illegal lLgging and Related TimberTrade–Dimensions, Drivers, Impacts and Responses: A Global Scientific Rapid Response Assessment Report*. Vienna: International Union of Forest Research Organizations (IUFRO) World Series Volume 35.

Labi, A. & Robinson, S. (2001, August 6). Looting Africa: Theft, Illicit Sales, Poverty and War are Conspiring to Rob a Continent of its Rich Artistic Heritage. Accessed 12 December 2022, https://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2056125,00.html.

Labouret, H. (1940). France's Colonial Policy in Africa. *Journal of the Royal African Society*, 39(154), 22-35.

Lawson, S., & MacPaul, L. (2010). Illegal Logging and Related Trade: Indicators of the Global Response. Chatham House, RIIA.

Leech, G. (2006). *Crude interventions: The U.S., Oil and the New World* Disorder. Zed Books.

Leipziger, D. (2010). Globalisation Revisited. In M. Spence, and D. Leipziger. (eds.), *Globalisation and Growth: Implications for a Post-crisis World* (pp. 3-33). The World Bank.

Lewis, C. S. (2015). *The Abolition of Man*. HarperOne.

Luckham, R. (1982). French Militarism in Africa. *Review of African Political Economy*, 24, 55-84.

Mandel, R. (2002). *Armies without state: The Privatisation of Security*. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.

Mandy, (2022, December 15). Uranium 238 Is Mined In Nigeria's Borno State, Not Californium-253. Accessed 13 February 2023, .

Marbury, H. (1995). Hazardous Waste Exportation: The Global Manifestation of Environmental Racism. *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law,* 28 (2), 251-296.

Marqusee, H. (2010, November 5). The Ultimate Weapon is no Weapon: Human Security and the New Rules of War and Peace. Accessed 11 February 2023, https://www.newsecurity beat.org/2010/11/the-ultimate-weapon-is-no-weapon-human-security-and-the-new-rules-of-war-and-peace/.

Mbeki, T. (2002). Address of the President of the Republic of South Africa at the Opening of the World Summit for Sustainable Development, Johannesburg, 2 August.

Merchant, C. (2005). *Radical Ecology: The Search for a lLivable World* 2nd ed. London: Routledge.

Mighty Earth (2019). *Cargill: The Worst Company in the World*. Accessed 16 October 2022, .

Moore, P. (2010). *Confessions of a Greenpeace Dropout: The Making of a Sensible Environmentalist.* Beaty Street Publishing, Inc.

Mumford, A. (2013). Proxy Warfare and the Future of Conflict. *The RUSI Journal*, 158(2), 40-46.

Musah, A. F. & Fayemi, J. K. (2000). *Mercenaries: An African Security Dilemma*. Pluto Press.

Ndikumana, L. (2015, July 2). How Africa can Overcome being Marginalised in the Global Economy. Accessed 3 October 2022, https://theconversation.com/how-africa-can-overcome-being-marginalised-in-the-global-economy-43873.

New York Declaration on Forests. NYDF.

Nhema, A. & Zeleza, P. T. (Ed*) (2008). The Roots of African Conflicts: The Causes and Costs*. Ohio University Press.

Nicholas, H. (2021, January 13). We must keep Africa Poor by All Means. Accessed 7

October 2022, https://www.google.com/search?q=We+must+keep+Africa+poor+by+all+means.

Nwankwo, G. O. (1988). French Military Policy in West Africa. *Nigerian Journal of International Studies*, 12.

O'Neill, D. W., Fanning, A. L., Lamb, W. F., Steinberger, J. K. (2018). A Good Life for All within Planetary Boundaries. *Nature Sustainability*, 1(2), 88–95.

Obi, C. (2012). Transnationalism, Africa's Rresource Curse' and 'Contested Sovereignties': The Struggle for Nigeria's Niger Delta. In S. Cornelissen, F, Cheru and T. M. Shaw (eds.), *Africa and International Relations in the 21st Century* (pp. 147-161). Palgrave Macmillan.

OECD (1997). Economic Globalisation and the Environment. OECD.

Ojo, O. (19999). *Economic Underpinnings of Security in Africa*. CASS Monograph No. 12. Centre for Advanced Social Science.

Omoweh, D. A. (2005). *Shell Petroleum Development Company, the State and Underdevelopment of Nigeria's Niger Delta: A study in Environmental Degradation*. Africa, World Press.

Orubu, C. O., Odusola, A., & Ehwarieme, W. (2004). The Nigerian oil Industry: Environmental Diseconomies, Management Strategies and the need for Community Involvement. *Journal of Human Ecology,* 16(3), 203-214.

Oruh, C. (2008). Militarising Africa: A Guidebook. Resist AFRICOM Working Group, Global Student Teach In, October, 24.

Park, R. S. (1998). An Examination of International Environmental Racism through the Lens of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes. *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies*, 5(2), 659-709.

Peebles, G. (2022, February 27). The 'keep Africa Poor and Dependent' Project. Accessed 12 November 2022, https://www.newagebd.net/article/163797/the-keep-africa-poor-and-dependent-project.

Post-Crisis World Institute. Models of Post-crisis Development: Global War or New Consensus. *International Research Paper*, November, 2009-January, 2010.

Regan. P. M. (2002). Third-party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflicts. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 46(1), 55-73.

Rich, B. (1990). The Emperor's New Clothes: The World Bank and Environmental Reform. *World Policy Journal*, 7(2), 305-329.

Rittberger, V., Nettesheim, M. (Ed.) (2008). *Authority in the Global Political Economy*. Palgrave MacMillan.

Roll, M. & Sperling, S. (Eds.) (2011). *Fuelling the World-Failing the Region? Oil Governance and Development in Africa's Gulf of Guinea*. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

Schmidt, E. (2013). *Foreign Intervention in Africa: From the Cold War to the War on Terror*. Cambridge University Press.

Servant, J. C., & Forster, H. (2003). Africa: External Interest and Internal Insecurity: The New Gulf Oil States. *Review of African Political Economy*, 30(95), 139-142.

Shelley, T. (2005). *Oil: Politics,Poverty and the Planet*. Zed Books Ltd.

Shiva, V. (2016). *Stolen harvest: The Hijacking of Global Food Supply*. University Press of Kentucky.

Sidorova, G. & Lyubenova, E. (2020). Contemporary Wars in Africa or 21st century Competition for Power. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 56(6), 1-20.

Silver, C. S., & DeFries, R. S. (1990). *One Earth One Future: Our Changing Global Environment.* National Academy of Sciences.

Skons, E. (2014). The Challenge of External Engagement in African Security. Accessed 16 October 2022, https://www.sipri.org/commentary/essay/2014/challenge-external-engagement-african-security.

Smith, N. (2014, January 6). The Dark Side of Globalisation: Why Seattle's 1999 Protesters were Right. Accessed 3 October 2022, https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/01/the-dark-side-of-globalization-why-seattles-1999-protesters-were-right/282831/.

Standing, A. (2017). Criminality in Africa's Fishing Industry: A Threat to Human Security. Africa Security Brief, No.33, June.

Steiner, C. (1994). *African Art in Transit*. Cambridge University Press.

Strange, S. (1996). *The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy*. Cambridge University Press.

Taherzadeh, O., Bithell, M., & Richards, K. (2021). Water, Energy and Land Insecurity in Global Supply Chains. *Global Environmental Change*, 67, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2020.102158.

Taylor, I. (2003). Conflict in Central Africa: Clandestine Networks and Regional/Global Configurations. *Review of African Political Economy,* 30(95), 45-55.

Taylor, I., & Williams, P. (Ed.) (2004). *Africa in International Politics: External Involvement on the Continent*. Routledge.

The Guardian (2015, July 21). George Clooney Seeks to Expose those Who Fund and Profit from Wars in Africa. Accessed 26 September 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/film/2015/jul/21/george-clooney-seeks-to-expose-those-who-fund-and-profit-from-wars-in-africa.

Thomas, C. (1992). *The Environment in International Relations*. RIIA.

Timamy, M. H. K. (2007). *The Political Economy of Technological Underdevelopment in Africa: Renaissance Prospects, Global Tyranny, and Organised Spoliation*. Centre for Black and African Arts and Civilisation (CBAAC).

Volman, D. (2003). The Bush Administration and African Oil: The Security Implications of U.S. Energy Policy. *Review of African Political Economy*, 30(98), 573-584.

Volman, D. (2015). China, India, Russia, and the United States: The Scramble for African Oil and the Militarisation of the Continent. In T. Young (ed.), *Readings in the Internatioal Relations of Africa* (pp. 309-321). Indiana University Press.

Wallerstein, I. (1974). *The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century*. Academic Press.

Warmerdam, W. (2021). *Chinese Forest-risk Financing–Financial Flows and Clients'Risks.* Profundo.

Wezeman, P. D., Wezeman, S. T., & Beraud-Sudreau, L. (2011). *Arms Flow to Sub-Saharan Africa*. SIPRI Policy Paper 30; SIPRI, Sweden, www.sipri.org.

Williams, S. (2021). *White Malice: The CIA and the Covert Recolonisation of Africa*. Hachette Book Group, Inc.

Yergin, D., & Stanislaw, J. (2002). *The Commanding Heights: The Battle for the World Economy*. Simon and Schuster, Inc.

Zurn, M. (1996). Global Dangers and International Cooperation: Are We on the Way to a World Risk ociety? *Law and State*, 53/5.