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REGIMES, RADICAL INTERNATIONALISM, AND THE INTERNATIONAL LETHAL ORDER

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Abstract
The international regimes of standard practices are crucial for managing international relations, and had become part of the international legal order. Their development to guide interstate relations gained prominence as soft power ever after a forward-looking diplomatic initiative had de-emphasised the use of war by states (the outlawry of war by Pact of Paris) in righting wrongs incurred from such interactions. Notably, since their deployment about seven decades ago, their observance have helped to keep humanity away from another total war. However, new states (Third World) in world politics have groused about the regimes and order. They alleged that the regimes restricted (delayed) Third World economies, and predisposed them to poverty and stagnation, because they were negotiated in their absence, and, hence, were largely unrepresentative of their national interests. Hence, also, they jointly demanded regimes-change and the renegotiation of a fair and equitable international order. However, they were rebuffed by the other party. They were later joined in the agitation by the radical internationalist and New Right Movements. This study, relying on secondary data sources, and utilising the historical method and content analysis, dissected the issues about international regimes and order, their applications, *modus operandi* and impact, *vis-à-vis* the advanced economies and the Third World. The study revealed that by nature and application, the regimes have had more enriching effects on the West than they have on the Third World. It also confirmed that this lopsided impact had driven some members of the Third World into adopting reactionary foreign policy. While a few states of the Third World had deliberately flouted the regimes to force change, others had desperately deployed nonconventional violence against the international system. The study concluded that the blunt adamance of the First World Realms (advanced economies) to yield have greatly endangered the global system vide transnational terrorism, plunging thereby the once thriving international legal order into a lethal order.

Keywords: *International Regimes, Regime Change, Regime Theory, International Peace and Security,*

Background to the Study

The practice of international relations is based on a fragile interstate system because there is no authoritave entity to instruct or direct relations. The whole gamut of international relations, conceived also as international system, is analogous to a theoretic biological system of the natural science. Like the human body, the international system is a living entity comprising several sub-entities interacting in coordination for the well-being of the whole. It is so-referred because the systemic order, and the actions of the engaging actors are based on the cognition and observance of certain defined rules and conventions, which else could trigger systemic chaos. Nonetheless, interstate relations can be frictional, and the system prone to destabilisation because the component states (comprising disparate peoples) are intrinsically racial, anarchic and self-dependent, and may consequently wish to resort to self-help. Also, interstate system is characteristically composed of autonomous national units that have to compete for growth and development because there is neither the

Leviathan nor a central allocator of value and equity to whom all states defer. Incidentally, states are unequally endowed, and requisite resources and prospects for advancements are grossly inadequate and unevenly spread. Thus also, and due to their interconnectedness, the quests by states to make out from resource predicaments may inevitably generate interstate intransigence. This may create international fracas as violated states may want to unilaterally seek redress.

However, interstate hostilities are incongruous with international peace, security and stability, upon which human/national preservation and advancements are predicated. It is rationally incumbent on nations and all relevant stakeholders, thus, to jointly manage and minimise their potentials for interstate fracas. In this vein, the interplay of international diplomacy for securing an enduring peace and security are germane and inestimable. Yet also, in addition to extant international law are the forging and concordance of appropriate regimes of international understanding for guiding and moderating interstate operations and garnering international cooperation toward a world order. They are key to mitigating the potentials for interstate hostilities. The use of international regimes would seamlessly guide and temper the conduct and right of states on the many and specific matters of joint interests, which had potentials for incendiarism. Logically thus, the cruciality for global peace, security, and the mutual growth of states rationalises the institution and observance of international regimes, while international diplomacy had been very decisive also, for its evolution and operation. By and large, and though that international relations had operated on a delicate system, yet, it had thrived largely on the mutual respect and understanding for the essence of international regimes by states.

But as the world interconnects more deeply, due especially to economic globalisation (that is, the progressively integrated global economy occasioned by free trade, free flow of capital, and a steep rise in the international movement of labour), these rapidly transposed the international systemic operations and human interactions with far-reaching consequences on interstate relations. Thus, concerns heightened about the sustenance of extant regimes, vis-a-vis their essence, rationality and sanctity. The streak of the second and third wave of globalisation (1900 to 2000, and 2000 to the present) had shrunk the world to a big village, and integrated the global economy through liberalisation policies. For Henrikson (2025), the dynamics of globalisation had become "a force… largely beyond the control of political leadership or… diplomacy." Thus, new issues have since emerged on the world stage, which on their own could transcendently trigger changes to international regimes and the diplomatic status quo ante. Similarly, new problems emerged, consequent upon recent industrial advancements (Third and Fourth Industrial Revolution), which largely bothered on steeped competitions for energy and material resourcing; the international management of shared natural assets (sea, air and space); and industrial waste management, etc. These have high proclivity for systemic endangerment, and are basically associated with the problem of economic growth (See: Ferguson, 2018).

Sequel to these problems, the 21st century records new forms of threats to world peace and security, leading to acute concerns for the maintenance, or otherwise, of international regimes. Such threats include poverty, disease, environmental degradation, violence and human rights violations, human trafficking, terrorism and organized crimes, and the proliferation of new weapons for mass destruction (Wilson Center, 2004). Also, recent rises in radical/extremist ideologies and use of terror for political ends, and even as statecraft made international stakeholders to be wary of any agent that may wish to torpedo international regimes, which have grave systemic consequences. In fact, toward the end of the last Millennium, stakeholders' concerns had been heightened beyond ever about the regimes. While some wanted the regimes maintained, others canvassed for its review or overhaul. Yet, a few radical internationalists, especially states with foreign policy heavily inclined to rational choice making, totally abhorred them. The last group particularly disdained international regimes and standards for being unduly intrusive and inimical

to their national interest since they restrict states' enterprises.

International regimes are a kind of 'soft powers' that are very vital and far cheaper for securing the world order. The use of 'soft power' for international peace enforcement is increasingly crucial and reliable especially as they are less dangerous than the destructive 'hard power' (which, of course every world power warehoused as backup). While hard power is coercive and abhorrent, soft power is persuasive and attractive. Soft power has the ability to affect others to obtain the desired outcomes through attraction rather than coercion or payment (Nye, 2008). International relations and regime theorists have realised that international regimes foster interstate understanding, and also stabilise interstate system that would ordinarily have been turbulent (Young, 1982 and Ruggie, 1982). Also, based on the experiences of the world wars, it is claimed that international regimes often had overbearing roles, not only in moderating interstate relations, but also in the direction and extent of divergence (anarchy) and or, convergence (unity) among nations (Haggard and Simmons,1987)). Hence, stakeholders in world peace and development are often wary of interstate activities and states that have potentials for disrupting the prevailing regimes. Abrupt regime-changes could trigger economic melt-down, hamper diplomatic status quo ante; world trade and industrial output; and as well, endanger global peace and human security. Such changes could destabilise the world, and so are undesirable.

International regimes, however, are diversely impactive on the fortune (or misfortune) of states. Of course, regimes are mostly pronounced on economic matters as they guard against interstate feuds especially in the processes of raw material sourcing and marketing. Thus, regimes are most basically affective on the economy of nations, as they foster conducive conditions for international economic operations, particularly regarding commerce and production. But, while compliance with certain regimes might be beneficial and enriching for some countries, they may be adverse on others. For the latter, it is logical and rational that they will seek to change such adverse regimes through their foreign policy projections, while the former by all means would strive to sustain, and resist any change to a rewarding regime. For instance, India rejected the Kyoto Protocol – a United Nations (UN) initiative seeking sought to curtail global warming by negotiating the allotment of national responsibilities toward reducing their emissions of the culprit greenhouse gas (GHG). Essentially, the Kyoto Protocol is aimed at instituting a treaty that would commit industrial economies to limit/reduce GHG emission. If the Treaty is sealed, it becomes a binding regime that would, thenceforth, condition electricity generation by nations to power their industries, through any resource, like coal, that emits GHG.

India protested and deemed the Protocol being pushed by advanced economies as capable of slowing down (delaying) its pace for industrialisation if it had to cut down on its coal-generated electricity. India deemed it a deliberate aim to curtail the growth of developing economies, and stressed on the disparity between the developed and developing nations in respect of the burden of responsibility for any climate action. India's argument blamed advanced economies for the problems of global warming and climate change, and that it would be heinous and unfair to share the responsibility of limiting and reducing GHG equally on all nations as it would delay industrial growth from up-and-coming states who were not direct culprits for climate ills. India thus got an exemption from commitments to GHG cuts. This spotlighted the criticality of international regimes on the fortune of nations.

This essay is not just to argue that regime changes do affect global peace and security, either negatively or positively, it also countered the hypothesis that regime-changes caused by radical states only harmed diplomacy, peace and security. Regime-changes do have potentials to further foster international harmony or induce conflicts, but they equally have potentials to rejig moribund or systemically outdated regimes. It argues that regime-change serve not necessarily to harm the world, but may also have positive impacts on systemic relations and the wealth of nations. The

essay expatiated upon this through notable world experiences at institutionalising, deconstructing or decommissioning international regimes.

Regimes, The Intervening Concepts And Clarifications

International Peace and Security

Following the series of colossus horrors witnessed particularly from the pre-modern Europe to the world wars, strenuous efforts were made by stakeholders and statesmen to manage and prevent the comity of nations from sliding back into such catastrophes. Such was the Emmanuel Kant's 1795 philosophical seminal envisioning a perpetual peace of nations. As a forerunner of world order, Kant posited that true peace is possible only when states are organised internally on republican principles, and externally into a voluntary league that promotes peace, and that this can be successfully achieved only jointly (Kleingeld, 2006). Clearly, Kant faulted outright freedom (sovereignty) to states, since the lack of compromise over adversarial interactions will make peace elusive. However, he never demanded impracticality – the making of overarching supra-entity to oversee interstate relations but emphasised the appeal of states to the rationality of gunning for cooperative relations in the manner of give-and-take if they wanted long-lasting peace. The attainment of international peace and security had since become a pressing pursuit, which today is the major preoccupation of the UN as enshrined in its Article One. The UN is obligated to take proactive, collective and effective measures to secure the world by preventing aggression, and removing threats to the peace.

To contextualise peace and security, vis-à-vis growth and development, and the evolution of international regimes, they need to be conceptually defined. What then is peace? What also is security? And, how do the two relate. It is also crucial ab initio to establish their significance to human advancement, as this requires that people dwell in situations devoid of calamities, or its anxiety. As Kimanuka (2018) affirmed, "a peaceful and secure environment is critical to every society since it affects all aspects of economic and social development in a country, and is a necessary sine qua non to the realization of human rights." Thus, peace and security are the promotive conditions for human development. As men dwell in national enclaves, it is impossible to have conditions devoid of conflicts, because interstate conflict abounds in their independent pursuits of foreign policies, particularly in their quests for scarce foreign-based resources. Rather, peace is not synonymous with total absence of turmoil but its management, to evolve a working order, despite. The below is a cursory definition of peace and security:

> A social and political condition that ensures development of individuals, society and nation… a state of harmony characterized by the existence of healthy relationships... a working political order that serves true interests of all. In the context of intra-national and international relations, peace is not merely the absence of war… but …a secure condition or feeling free from fear… of an individual, an institution, a region, a nation or the world, (Social science, MODULE – 4).

Soltani and Moradi (2017) contextualised peace and security beyond the absence of war and direct violence, as the political conditions that guarantee social justice and stability through institutions, procedures and the formal and non-formal norms. These versions of definitions linking peace with institutional procedures fits most appropriately within the objectives of this essay, as international regimes are themselves procedural and institutional.

International Diplomacy

German chancellor Otto von Bismarck (1871), simply described diplomacy as "the never-ending negotiation of reciprocal concessions between states" [see: Volker Stanzel (Ed.), 2018]. Gearing toward a working definition is the idea that diplomacy involves intricate negotiation. But negotiations about what, and to what end? Cornago (2008) attempted a definition of diplomacy as the conduct of international

relations by negotiation and dialog, or by any other means to promote peaceful relations among states. The diplomatic negotiations aimed to influence the decisions and behaviour of governments away from war or violence. Thus, the endeavour of diplomatic negotiations and activities is to maximize a group's advantages without the risk and expense of using force, and preferably without causing resentment and disgust to the would-be-affected others. Since the human or a national activity is never a one-off thing, it could be established that international diplomacy involves deliberate and continuous negotiations toward foisting international peace and security, and avoiding unpalatable conflicts, which would be, in the absence of diplomacy. While Langhorne (2005) affirmed that "diplomacy is a necessary and natural part of the (current) international order" yet, its practice and use are never recent they largely predate recorded history. However, the current diplomatic system is an offshoot of the classical diplomacy that developed since Westphalia Peace Treaty in the 17th century. It is logical to contend that international diplomacy is important for setting an international order that is commodious for peace and security, in the quest for growth and development. Also, for a world that seeks greater reliance on 'soft power', international diplomacy is sanctimonious for evolving international regimes of order.

Regime Theory And Change - What Are International Regimes

Regime change, simply, is a transformation from the operating phase of a certain regime to another. But that transformation presupposes the prior existence of substantive regimes, whose conceptual meaning must first be explicated, using the theory of regimes. It is also germane to establish ab initio that the international system is operationally anarchical and non-hierarchical. Sovereign states, which basically are the international actors, had the freedoms of struggle by rational choice and zero-sum competitions, which again portend propensity for high interstate volatility. Such unbridled freedoms orchestrated the turbulence that boomeranged in World War I (WWI), then the most brutal war. Its brutality encouraged the then Great Powers to work toward a multilateral agreement that would eliminate war as statecraft, or, as means for righting international wrongs. The Pact of August 27, 1928 was styled the most grandiose peacekeeping effort after WWI (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2015).

With French diplomatic initiative, and the critical support of the United States, the ultimate aim of the multilateral Pact was to evolve an international system of protective alliances that would not just deter the resurgence of German aggression, {particularly after the dismal failure of the League of Nations (Société des nations)} but commit all nations into renouncing war as an instrument of national policy, and to settle all international disputes by peaceful means. It also outlawed war except in need of self-defence. International subscription to the Pact was popular although it failed to prevent World War II for its abuses and misinterpretations. However, it became the fertile soil upon which the roots of international regimes were planted. Thus, the envisioned system of protective alliances informed the eventual formation of international regimes as soft powers to guide the conduct of international relations.

Yet, despite the realities of international anarchy and the freewill of nations, it is observed, and upon which international behaviour is institutionalized, that there is rationale for cooperative practices among states which often calmed the would-be volatility, somewhat (Ruggie, 1975). This cooperative behaviour and its triggers, deemed as harbingers of international regimes, informed the development of regime theory. Haggard and Simmons (1987) alternated international regimes as 'patterned behaviour' as Ruggie (1982) categorised them as social institutions which operates by limiting the discretion of their constituent units (states) to decide and act on issues that fall within the regime's domain. International regimes act, more or less as international laws that nations abide by in their international conduct, and thereby helping the world to put international actors in check/order. Thus, stakeholders enunciated the occurrence of cooperative behaviours among states by focusing on the role that regimes play in

"mitigating international anarchy and overcoming various collective action problems among states" (Bradford, 2007).

Defining international regimes are contentious, rather, their nature, purposes and modus operandi are better explicated. Both Ruggie (1982) and Stephen Krasner (1983) suggested an underpinning of regimes as a set of principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Regime theory contends that this convergence of expectations, which facilitates or elicits cooperative behaviour among sovereign states are critical for mitigating interstate anarchy and dissension. Regimes are coordinate standards to which member-states (are expected to) conform to mitigate interstate anarchies that may otherwise ensue. Neoliberal institutionalists (who held that interstate cooperation is feasible and sustainable for reducing conflict and competition) orchestrated the instituting of regimes and its adherence to engender interstates' collaboration, regulate interstates' behaviour, and restrain excessive states, to secure international peace and tranquillity, ultimately.

The term: converge, captures the operational phrase denoting the nature of regimes as a focus of international understanding, regarding issues of mutual concerns to which nations freely relate. Regimes operate and sustain by consensual international volition, than compulsion. But the adherence of states to regimes over time begets international addiction, because, once a regime is enacted, it becomes a compelling new norm that is eventually habituated. This attribute, which garners international traditions, qualified regimes as ancillaries of international law to which nations are thence obligated. Thus, when nations renege on regimes, there could be systemic destabilisation, shocks and shortcomings. States that renege, covertly or overtly, are often denigrated, especially by the affected states. Such was the United States' classification of some states (North Korea, Cuba, Libya, Iraq and Iran) as Rouge States or axis of evil by the Clinton and Bush Administrations. These states had disregarded certain international norms, traditions and regimes, sometimes wilfully.

International regimes must not be confused with the other use of regimes in the political sense, which denote the political mode or rule of state. Such are military rule, democratic rule, fascism or monarchism, etc. The rules have their peculiar doctrinal genres, structures and methodology for state's governance. These strands of government, or the modes of rule are also referred to as regimes in reference to their distinctive duration, impact and consequence especially on citizens and geopolitics. Thus, in comparative politics we distinguish the authoritarian regimes from non-authoritarian, and the military from democratic regimes. Also, political regimes undergo transformation (regime change), such as military regime to the civilian, authoritarian regime to the democratic, and monarchical regime to the Republican. However, these strand of regimes operate in a very formal setting; they critically inform governmental decisions and govern the everyday life of citizens. Some political regimes are very coercive, especially the totalitarian/authoritarian regimes because they have a skewed view about human rights and freedoms, which may be at variance with the political agenda of state. Thus, they often take absolute control over the affairs of state and citizens, which may consequently limit/hamper peoples' rights and freedoms. On Rousseauist state contract theory, authoritarian states are tyrannical, contrary to the democratic or republican that are often tolerant, and even promotive of rights and freedoms. On the other genre, international regimes govern interstate affairs. They are voluntary (in a sense), and far-less formalistic or coercive in moderating the conducts of participating actors, the states. They serve as consensual guides (not in the hard–and–fast sense) ordering the conducts of relations among respective international actors.

International regimes abound for various strands/issues of international relations such as: trade and economy, collective environment, international/collective security, and human/animal rights, etc. This is due to the complexities, and the multiplicity of issues in international politics. Many international treaties

are also categorised as regimes. The destructiveness of world wars made world statesmen to nurture soft powers and cooperation to de-emphasise the use of hard power in righting international wrongs. The alternative is to float international regimes as soft powers, guiding around common but contentious interests in national strives to pursue self-interests. Revisiting the Kantian seminal, the institutional regimes precisely epitomised his voluntary league moderating different interstate dealings through the convergence of their expectations in respect of matters, which otherwise would be conflictual. Regimes, thereby, secure international peace. Ever since, experiences about international regimes are that they have proved to be reliable and capable of moderating or mediating the would-be conflictual instances; thus mitigating interstate anarchy. It is factual that the observance of international regimes had lessened national resorts to wars. However, it does not void the instances of radical or belligerent deviations from regime systems; the few deviant states have had their reputations tarnished as being unworthy of international trusts. Regime-betrayers are usually reprimanded by the comity of nations through varying degrees (from mild to harsh) and means (persuasive to coercive) of sanctions.

By mere simple instinct of rationale, international regimes may be instituted spontaneously when states' expectations converge reasonably and seamlessly, and without need for its engineering. Sometimes, the simplicity of instituting international regimes may be amazingly simple as when nations, in droves, just jumped on the bandwagon. International regimes can also be negotiated through consensual bargaining. They can easily evolve when concerned issues are readily appealing or strategic, especially when it is most likely a win-win situation for nations. Also, some dire situations could be mutually compelling, especially when international security is at stake, and the potential jeopardy knows no border.

But regimes may get changed, obsolete, or transformed, while new ones can get formed always. For instance, as the world grew further, and by the Millennium, new problems of growth evolved, which were also transnational and multifaceted. They were so damning that the UN sought for new regimes and conventions, or, regime-amendments to capture and curtail them. In 2003, the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan established a committee (High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change) to address the new evil to human security. They included rising poverty; hunger; disease; environmental degradation; interstate conflicts; terrorism; human right violations; organised crime and WMD (Wilson Center, 2004). Also, powerful nations can initiate regime-change, or, as well impose, shape or maintain the contents of regimes on weak states, either through coercion, adoption and co-option, and even manipulation (Young, 1982). Regimes are never permanent, hence the occurrence of regime change. Occasionally regimes can be ad-hoc or tenurial if their issues are brief or temporary. Regime-changes are inevitable just as international relations are dynamic, and the dynamism is to an array of change-inducing factors such as the ideological/psychological inclinations of national leaders, especially of radical or powerful states.

Regimes may prolong as the issues are bothersome. Efficient regimes had transmuted into formal structures and institutions. For instance, Ruggie (1982) affirmed that the regimes for money and trade had critically informed the 'structuralisation' of the international economic order since the WWII. Regimes are also pliable by many forces. As affirmed at the beginning, international regimes are differentially rewarding to states, while some states are well enriched, many orders are poorly. Regimes that helped many states may hinder the development of many others. Thus, states that felt encumbered by international regimes often seek to resist or change them. States, wont of regime-change are usually given to radical political orientation either through its leaders or the political regime of government. However, it is held that regime-change often have consequences which may be positive or negative (SAGE, 2021).

State Radicalism And Regime Change

Across the globe, radical political forces, otherwise referred as radical internationalists, are

influencing and transforming the landscape of international politics (Drolet & Williams, 2021). Of course, radical internationalism is not peculiar to state actors only, there are many non-state actors embracing the change perspective to the status quo ante in international politics. Also, radical conservative political parties, transnational movements, populist and nationalist forces are acting, concertedly, as 'international-nationalist' movements to challenge the prevailing norms, practices, and institutions. Ultimately, it led to the emergence of an unpredictable and troubling right-wing international, also termed the 'New Right' who often resort to 'reactionary ends' to enforce or attain their rights and goals, (Drolet & Williams, 2021).

State radicalism is an ideological stance in international relations whereby states that are discontented with status quo norms and conventions are wont to be rebellious. Usually, they attack and seek vital changes to the worlds' political, economic and legal orders. Radicalist states blamed their economic woes, particularly, on the forced international standards practices, and chose to attack them by antisystemic and reactionary means. Radical internationalism is a revolt ideology against existing protocols, standard practices and the understanding that underpinned the current international relations, hence, it majorly confront the regimes deemed unjust and inimical to the growth of new states. Also, since the regimes had been bolstered by the founding powers, the former's radicalism constitutes assault on the world powers whose national and international interests had been secured and reinforced by the regimes' tradition. Hence, the affected powers would fight back to repress the reactionaryism by all means and might. Conservative states held regimes' tradition to be the legitimate systemic right of order (Old Rights) which had existed before the radicalist states were absorbed into the system. The Old Rights officiate mostly in the areas of international economy, currency and exchange rates, access to world trade and market, raw materials and energy sourcing, collective security, armament and others. But, radicalists felt that the old rights were unjust and narrow, hence they strive for new rights by negotiation and confrontation to achieve international equity.

From a critical look of this study, the backlash against radicalist states may not have been borne out of genuine concern to uphold international standard practices on the pretext that they help to secure and stabilise the world. The radicalists/New Rights claimed that the counter-assaults had been launched by those who purportedly benefitted from the regimes' sustenance, in order to keep securing their vested interests. They believed that the conservative powers dreaded the possibility that their fortune would be adversely affected by regime-changes if their efforts were not checkmated, whereas also, the former claimed to being worsted by the same regimes. Thus, the imbroglio for regimes' change or sustenance had pitched the Old Rights against the New Rights. It is thus a war for, or, against the existing global standards, norms, regimes, conventions and protocols. As conservative Powers seek to protect the old international rules, including their privileges as pioneers of the order, the radicalists coveted a new global order because the old rights were deemed parochial and unrepresentative of new global realities.

This work noted that the existing international standard practices were negotiated and situated among the First World (Western liberal democracies/capitalists and United States) though later consented by the Second World (Eastern communist Soviet Union and allies). They were procured as ways and means to deter another economic depression, interstate aggressions, settle Great Powers' in-fighting, and conduct international relations between the Wars (1919-1945 and beyond). Given the tensile situation if humanity must survive and thrive, the negotiation of standard international practices was crucial for averting a global horror. Thence, the values instituted were actually the terms and conditions procured to guide and avert adversarial international relations, and a third, ruinous world war. The means and standards – as regimes, conventions, norms and protocols, had partly-patterned the international order, and had since been consolidated and settled.

Incidentally, the major world powers (United States, Britain, France and Germany) that seek to protect the international standard practices

belonged in the First World. Yet, most radicalist states (Iraq, Iran, Syria, Sudan, North Korea, Cuba, Venezuela, Libya and even China) were neither in the First nor Second Worlds, but the Third World (a group of states that were still dependencies and colonies, or, not yet in the mainstream comity of nations). As Third World states gained political sovereignty in the sixties to the eighties, they got ushered in situ the existent world order, vis-à-vis regimes, conventions, rules and principles, which, in part would curtail the freedoms of new states. At independence, most new states had basked in the false euphoria of being overly free. They were naive to the encumbrances of the international system with which they would relate/operate. Such ignorance was when Nigeria's Prime Minister, Tafawa Balewa told the UN General Assembly at barely a week after colonial independence that "One great advantage which… new nations have is that the accession to independence makes a clear break with our past and presents us with the opportunity to enter… international relations untrammelled by (any) commitments" (Balewa, 1960). Most new states never knew that they were merely quitting colonial subjugation for a constricting system called 'international order.' Thus, Balewa's idea of an untrammelled nation, commonly held by most new states were false, ab initio.

Radicalist states felt that, safe their compliance with the order for the purpose of stabilising interstate system, it had not bestowed on them the same enriching effect it had on the previous world realms. Rather, it had tied their hands from maximising their potentials; perpetuated their economic stagnation and engendered multifarious international inequalities. Even when they attempt to pursue their national interests in defiance of the regimes, international moratoriums on arms and armament had forestalled efforts at securing themselves against aggression by the very Powers that secured them. Radicalists contend that the old order was cast in a setting that is odd from their post-independence. They adjudged the old order obsolete, to be discarded for a newly negotiated order, which captures new global realities. The Global New Rights and Radical internationalists contend that the forced sustenance of old order, which had paid the West, were actually a conspiracy to exclude growth and development from the Third World, hence, the act is sheer western hegemony to dominate the world.

It needs recall that most international regimes, norms, conventions and principles sprang in-between the Wars. This paper observed that international standards began to cast at the instance of Kellogg-Briand Multilateral Pact (Pact of Paris), which, though outlawed war as a tool of statecraft (except for self-defence) and committed signee nations to settle international disputes by peaceful means. Treaty excerpts below are succinct:

> Persuaded that the time has come when a frank renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy should be made to the end that the peaceful and friendly relations now existing between their peoples may be perpetuated; Convinced that all changes in their relations with one another should be sought only by pacific means and be the result of a peaceful and orderly process, and that any signatory Power which shall hereafter seek to promote its national interests by resort to war should be denied the benefits furnished by this Treaty; Hopeful that, encouraged by their example, all the other nations of the world will join in this humane endeavour and by adhering to the present Treaty as soon as it comes into force bring their peoples within the scope of its beneficent provisions, thus uniting the civilized nations of the world in a common renunciation of war as an instrument of their national policy; Have decided to conclude a Treaty…(Encyclopædia Britannica, 2015).

If nations would not right their wrongs by war, then, some common understanding in the forms of conventions, principles and rules of engagement had to be established to govern/manage international relations – collective international governance. Of course, the road to the Pact, vis-à-vis multilateral/collective diplomacy began a century earlier with the 1815 Concert of Europe, the 1899 and 1907 Hague conferences, and the establishment of 'public international unions' to deal with problems emanating from European

interstate relations (Mingst, 1999). But Great Powers with great interests, the WWI horror necessitated strive for multilateral consultations, which included the United States, a preponderant but non-European power, in order to broaden the fledgling international governance that sprouted in 1815. The developments were harbinger to the evolution of a pristine world order succinctly captured by H. G. Wells (1940) in his book, The New World Order, as the ideal of a world without war, and in which law and order emanated from a world governing body. Today, the Pact of Paris had crystallised the Wells' anticipated world order and governing body, vide the international law, rules and regimes, protocols and conventions.

A further development was the emergence of various Intergovernmental Organisations (IGOs) such as the United Nations, World Bank and World Trade organisation: to play crucial roles in international governance. For Karen Mingst (1999); the IGOs spearheaded the creation and maintenance of international regimes. Later, the pact was signed by nearly all nations way back 1928, when the larger part of the world was yet to carve out as national entities of today. Specifically, virtually all nations categorised as radicalist, and the entire African were yet to evolve as nation-states. The total original states that signed the Pact on 27 August 1928 were fifteen. They included most Great Powers, France and the United States the joint initiators, Britain and its allies – Canada, India, Australia, Ireland and New Zealand, and, Germany, Italy, Japan, Belgium, Poland, Czechoslovakia and South Africa. The Soviets initially refrained, but later ratified it by 24 July 1929 when it took effect. Finally, forty-seven other nations acceded to the Treaty, making a total of sixty-two, ever. Today however, a hundred and ninety-three nations interact at the UN. It must be noted that the current international system had cast, ever since, by the terms and conditions of the Pact, and all new states, ever after, were drafted into its system without being Pact-signee. By default, thus, all states without exception, theretofore and thereafter became subject to the Pact so referred as "humane" and "beneficent."

The question is apt if it was fair to incorporate over a hundred other nations into a pact that was originally negotiated by, and instituted for fifteen states on terms and conditions that were strange to the former's situation. So, how truly had the pact been humane and beneficent to the former? If the answer is positive, then, new states had no justification to demand a new systemic modus operandi/vivendi. But then, were the Global New Rights and Radical Internationalists wrong to brand the existing systemic structure a western conspiracy to dominate the world? Perhaps, they are unaware that since the Concert of Europe, a 'special status' privilege had been accorded Great Powers during multilateral diplomacies (Mingst, 1999), as first-rate states in the comity of nations. The emanating question is whether the accordance of special statuses to a handful of nations is justifiable within the context of sovereign equity of states. The caveat is the Drolet & Williams (2021)' conclusion that radical political forces may turn reactionary. Another maxim warned, "Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable" (Kennedy, 1962). The final poser is whether the current transnational terrorism would have been averted if rules, regimes, protocols and conventions had been revisited as the new states demanded? The posers and caveats shall be addressed, subsequently.

A first major attempt by Third World states – organised as Group 77 (G77), to peacefully seek regime-change especially in the area of economy was the effort to launch a New International Economic Order (NIEO). The G-77 (from the original 77 signatories on June 15, 1964 which later blossomed to 130 nations) is a loose alliance of developing states committed to defending members' economic interests via insistence on equal standing with developed countries in the global marketplace, through a united front on issues of common concern. The NIEO was a multilateral initiative aimed at improving the dire economies of Third World states, vis-à-vis the few extremely wealthy, western industrial advanced economies. Today, they are referred as the Global North (GN) versus Global South (GS), and the contentious issues are the same: wide inequalities in terms of wealth and development, and the dominant hold of Global North on world order, power, industry and trade. The GS groused that the

order had delayed their economic progress, whereas it had fast-tracked the advancement of the GN. The delayed economies thus, got pitched in battle with the advanced economies.

Ruggie (1982) had affirmed that the regimes for money and trade informed the evolution of the International Economic Order since WWII. That order had critically guided the nitty-gritty of import/export and Terms of Trade (TOT), which again determine the fortunes of nations. For GS, the TOT was always unfavourable due to the ridiculous prices attached to commodity export. Thus, the G-77, organised variously as Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) at Cold War, tabled their request concerning international trade in raw materials at UN General Assembly (April 1974) as a Declaration and Programme of Action for a New International Economic Order. Reviling their deplorable economic situation especially by their persistently unfavourable TOT, G-77 projected NIEO to redesign world trade such that commodity prices would increase steadily to negate the unfavourable terms of trade and economic disarticulation. Their meagre foreign incomes had debarred them from ably financing infrastructure and industrialisation, hence, their persistent economic stagnation. Thus, since commodity trade was the economic mainstay of virtually all G-77, they clamoured an institution to ultimately govern primary exports, globally, and square the prices of primary produce vis-a-vis prices that G-77 countries paid for manufactured imports from industrial economies. They also demanded: tariff reductions on G-77 exports to advanced economies; debt relief and development assistance; technologies' transfer at minor costs; and, more control for G-77 states over commodity exports. Above all, G-77 desired effective roles for the Third World on the boards of the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and World Trade Organisation. In essence, NIEO targeted a fair redistribution of global income, claiming, it was "intolerable for some to enjoy an uncontrolled existence in exchange for the poverty and misfortune of others" (Ojo and Sesay, 2002). Huge storms trailed the launch of NIEO, which was scorned by United States, and other advanced economies. Although G-77 later compromised on some demands to woo the cooperation of industrial economies, yet, the latter rejected significant portions of NIEO, and President Ronald Reagan declared NIEO dead at 1981 Cancun Summit (Murphy, 1984).

For Ojo and Sesay, NIEO ended in dismal failure because "the move was essentially seen by the developed countries of the North as an attempt by the South to turn the economic tables round in their favour." Rather, Stephen Kinzer ascribed the failure to NAM's attempt to become a 'Third Force' in world politics (see: BrainyMedia, 2025). However, it would be delusional for the Third World (the delayed economies) to conceive itself as Third Force in world politics. Besides being too large and unwieldy (ununited), it amounted to self-deceit to contend with Cold War political dispensation without requisite fire power, where world powers had reserved the rights of 'pre-emptive strikes' on perceived enemies of their interests. So, the Third World's mere reliance on mere 'moral opprobrium' to meddle in a militarised ideological struggle of two Superpowers blocs were in gross error. However, the outright dismissal of NIEO was not just an act of international cruelty; it was a crime against humanity because it represented an inhuman hegemonic decision to condemn the Third World citizens into a lifetime peasantry; and a larger portion of the world into the West's fiefdom. The major ills that bedevilled Third World today stemmed from the western decision to reject NIEO.

However, the failure of NIEO significantly weakened the morale of Third World states who had only demanded their fair exercise of sovereignty and equality rights as co-members of the comity of nations. Consequently, it berthed the Right to Development initiative in 1986. This became interpreted liberally as international human right that ultimately led concerned states and movements to adopt radical internationalism or reactionaryism as means of righting their perceived wrongs from the West if they must break free from their shackles of poverty, occasioned by their engagement with international politics. The Kennedy maxim: that "those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent

revolution inevitable" is factual to their reactionaryism. The NIEO was prototypic of Kennedy's peaceful revolution, and although they won some, they lost most, and the few reforms they got ridiculed the holistic issues that facilitated the inequalities. The few rich industrial economies were unwilling to renegotiate the existing norms and conditions that served to their exclusive advantage, but which counteractively delayed the others' economies. If indeed the system was "humane" and "beneficent" it is unlikely that any member-state would revile it, and if truly the system is intended for all members, then, it should be open for radical reforms in accordance with international dynamics. The stiff opposition by the few advanced economies to holistically address the poverty of the majority whose economies had been delayed prompted a few states to opt for reactionary internationalism, vis-à-vis international terrorism.

Radical internationalism had been adopted by a couple of states ever since they realised the staunch determination of the advanced countries to not renegotiate the world order. Such are North Korea, Iran, Iraq and Cuba, Venezuela, Libya and a few others. If, for the lack of right military power the aggrieved states could not utilise conventional warfare to right their perceived systemic wrongs, they would opt to sabotage the system by guerrilla means. Today, international terrorism is rife, and it has been largely attributed to the states mentioned above. For instance:

- North Korea became so militarised and self-isolated, having adopted a policy of "military first politics" in response to the world order championed by the United States.
- Iran adopted radical internationalism against the lopsided international order championed by the United States.
- Third World oil producers floated the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries to counter the earlier oil cartel of the Seven Sisters (first generation oil giants) whose dominance had been facilitated by the western-propped international economic system.
- The Libyan sponsorship of Pan Am 103 bombing at Lockerby, killing all 259 passenger and crew (mostly Americans) and 11 others on the ground, was to protest the world order fostered by the United States.
- Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein aggressively annexed Kuwait in indirect attack against the international economic system championed by the United States.
- The infamous 9/11 terrorism were against the symbols upholding the international political and economic order (World Trade Center and Pentagon).

The case of Iran is noteworthy. The Middle-Eastern Shia-Islamic state is currently contesting regimes, especially in the areas of environment and collective security. Following the Islamic revolution of 1979, Iran is perhaps today the next most isolated country after North Korea, an isolation that is vigorously pushed by the United States and allies to succumb Iran to the world order. But Iran had never been internationally hostile always. Prior to its Islamic revolution, Iran, under the monarchical rule of Mohammed Reza Shah (last king crowned in 1941) had been integrated into the international system, and fully respected all international norms, law and practices. Hitherto, Iran was well-courted by the international community. The Shah even hired the American Central intelligence Agency (CIA) and Israeli MOSSAD to train Iran's intelligence agency, and even shared intelligence with the World. For Salehzadeh (2013), "things changed when the West-minded Shah was overthrown and forced into exile in 1979." Though secular, the Shah was deemed a western stooge and too autocratic, which consequently steered internal dissensions that paved way for Khomeini-led revolution. The radicals castigated Shah's modernisation policies, and alleged that he subjected Iran to American and Zionist interests (Abrahamian, 1993).

After Iran became Islamic, the exercise of political Islam significantly altered its foreign policy as authorities challenged or reneged on international regimes particularly on trade, collective security, arms procurement and nuclear research. The Iranian administration of President Ahmadinejad (2005-2013) repeatedly threatened to obliterate Israel, which he derogated as western outpost to dominate the Middle East. The West was wary of Iran's romance with terrorists and willingness to acquire mass-destructive weapons.

President George W. Bush in 2002 branded Iran, with North Korea and Iraq as "axis of evil" (Afrasiabi and Malek, 2003). Iran had since garnered international notoriety for insecurity, threatening the safety of international shipping lines; disturbing the collective security system by sponsoring rebel insurrections in countries; and defiantly pursuing nuclear programmes. Today, the West deemed Iran harmful to the international system and diplomacy, peace and security over its clamour for changes to the world order.

International Order And Western Obstinacy

The Western obstinacy to profoundly address the economic plight of the majority states was worrisome. While this work never justified terrorism in any form, it rather argued, that today's transnational terrorism majorly resulted from the refusal to readily address the international economic imbalance. The United States at Kennedy's Presidency was a clear cut from Reagan's. Kennedy was kindly committed to the global commonwealth, while Reagan was aggressive. The abandonment of America's international goodwill is due to the rise of Neoconservatives (Neo-Cons) into prominence, shortly after Kennedy's assassination. Neo-Cons despised the Democrats' pacifism and flawed their antipoverty programs as utopian. Rather, they advocated strong and aggressive foreign policy, including regular use of military power in pursuit of American interests (Ribuffo, 2025). Ribuffo claimed further that as radical socialists while being youths, the Neo-Cons had been partly-blamed for inciting the US into Cold War. Neo-Cons supported expansive government action externally by a muscular foreign policy predicated on the expansion of U.S. military power and ideological warfare. Particularly, Neo-Cons reviled any sympathy for Third World nationalism and the clamour for a reformed world order, turning the US away from commonwealth globalism to combative globalism.

Ever since the US opted for combative globalism, a whole lot of reactionary attacks had surged, either against the US, its allies, or globally, which jeopardised international security. Also, under Neo-Cons' leading, US governments since Reagan regularly utilised moral terms to slander uncondescending states. It began with Reagan's characterisation of Soviet Union as an "evil empire." Petra Minnerop noted that throughout the second half of the 20th Century the US developed varied stigmatised ascriptions for states, vis-a-vis its perspectives on international security. Minnerop further made a compendium of such classifications from Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, to Bill Clinton, down to George Bush jnr., which included terrorist states, renegade regimes, rogue states, state sponsor of terrorism and states supporting international terrorism. The last branding included Cuba (since 1982), Iran (since 1984), Iraq (since 1990), Libya (since 1979), North Korea (since 1988), Sudan (since 1993) and Syria (since 1979). Other groupings by Madeline Albright, as Secretary of State, are the community of democracies, emerging democracies, international good citizens (to denote friends in Third World), and countries where a state hardly exists, as Somalia and Sierra Leone. [Minnerop is cited in Bogdandy & Wolfrum (eds) 2003].

When liberal hawks could instigate Ronald Reagan to damn the Soviet Union, the Third World agitations stood no chance. The NIEO and other yearnings from the Third World came when the American mind-set switched to offensive internationalism, an attitude shared also by its western allies. Thenceforth, the nation toed the aggressive path to engage the world. Although the Neo-Cons' approach succeeded at triumphing over Soviet Union, and stifling Third World's aspiration for critical reforms in global governance, nevertheless, their method pushed some international actors (state and non-state) into reactionaryism. In frustration, radicalist states and movements plotted against the world order by unconventional means. The West's blunt refusal to remake a win-win Order plunged the world into the current plague of terrorism.

Conclusion

Without doubt, the fusion of international regimes and standards with international law have relatively stabilised the global system. They have fostered global governance; halted the tide of

international anarchy, and minimised the resort to war by states. In fact, for good eight decades now they have managed interstate relations and kept the world free from another total war, notwithstanding the tensile Cold War, within. In return, the stability and security had yielded profound advancements in multiple dimensions which triggered massive growth in global wealth. The international order had provided the right conditions that enabled national and global advancements. However, the major achievements and wealth had rather favoured the West, while most Third World states that were incorporated, willy-nilly, had been impoverished and depressed by the bottlenecks that it imposed on their economies. The wealth differential proved that regimes and standards have had more enriching effects on the first world realms, who, incidentally were the originators and enforcers of the order. The bleakness of prospects had turned much of the Third World into failed states. The ever-worsening situation had further fuelled human-flights (manpower-loss and brain-drain) from the Third World to the advanced economies. The Third World's delayed economies are most likely to remain angry and reactionary unless critical reforms are made especially on the economic order to reverse their backwardness. The United States under Neo-cons' influence had clearly charted an international lethal order, pretended as a legal order, notwithstanding the stability and peace it bequeathed to the system. In most cases, for the Third World, the dire situations are not self-afflicted but systemically imposed. Today, it is a bellicose world as majority states are barely subsisting under extreme poverty, and poverty-induced violence. Failed states like Iraq, Somalia, Libya and many others in Africa had become international public bads that imperil their regions. From the world's advanced economies to the Third World's delayed economies in Africa, South Asia and South America, it is a beleaguered world and humanity. A far-reaching reforms to the current international order would significantly scale-down international radicalism, conflicts and terrorism.

Notes

[1]By *delayed economies* (DE) is to conceptually distinguish the *advanced economies* (AE) from the non-advanced – also variously sorted as *emerging* or *developing* economies. AE, also referred as *developed* or *mature* economies are the high-level industrial nations with huge and supportive economies for large exportations of diverse finished goods and services, which in turn yielded high per capita income and a buoyant financial sector that underpinned the global economy/financial system. The mammoth wealth accumulated by AE also availed them huge military and financial muscle for global hegemony. IMF listed 41 states as AE, the major seven (G7) being: United States, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, United Kingdom and Italy, but including the Asian Tigers (see: IMF, 2025). Notably, the IMF listed China and Russia with Haiti and Sierra Leone as *emerging*/*developing* economies. Rather, the DE are states whose economic mainstay remained the commodity exports. Being primary produce (raw materials), commodity exports attract poor pricing. The pricing differentials had been so structured by the international economic order. Incidentally, this order had been imposed on Third World by *advanced economies*. The verb *delayed* denoted the restrictive effects that the imposition have had especially on Third World's economic progress, largely as commodity exporters. The low earnings had deprived them of becoming wealthy, and also starved them of funds for Research and Development for industrialisation, so, they are perpetuated as commodity exporters. Given their poor economic output and per capita income, they are inconsequential to the global financial system. This concept is aimed at de-emphasizing the phrase – *developing* since most new states are scarcely surviving – much less developing – due to the restrictive effects of the economic order. However, the order never foreclosed advancement to Third World, it only made it tortuous. With the right internal factors, foreign policy and alignments, appropriate national reforms, discipline and determination, and shrewd leadership, *delayed economies* can breakthrough. Despite the odds, history recalls the brilliance of

Deng Xiaoping (1978-1997) at building the modern industrialised China, and Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew (1959-1990), the strict leader that made Singapore prosperous. They are unlike Nigeria whose military administration at about same period claimed that "money was not Nigeria's problem, but how to spend it." Hence, General Yakubu Gowon's government wasted the mammoth fortune from the oil boom of 1970s to corruption, mismanagement and frivolity.

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